Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil by Filho, Alfredo Saad
Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development
Policy in Brazil
ALFREDO SAAD FILHO | SOAS, University of London
This paper offers a political economy analysis of the two systems of accumulation in the
postwar Brazilian economy: import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) and new liberalism,
and the industrial policies associated with them. The transition between these two systems of
accumulation from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s is reviewed in the light of the country’s key
macroeconomic indicators and the political developments which have determined the choice
and implementation of economic policy in each period. It is argued that, despite their signifi-
cant achievements, both ISI and new liberalism were implemented unevenly and inconsistent-
ly, and that their shortcomings can be analysed at two levels: internal micro- and macro-eco-
nomic limitations preventing these development strategies from achieving their stated aims,
and external limitations imposed by social conflicts during each period of time. The paper con-
cludes, first, that industrial policies are closely associated with specific state structures, economic
constraints, and political configurations which can be analysed only concretely (there can be no
general theory of industrial policy, and there is no ‘optimum path’ of accumulation under late
development). Second, each system of accumulation is limited by a distinctive set of historically
specific economic and political constraints, which set limits to its potential development. Third,
and precisely for these reasons, industrial policy is irreducibly political and context-specific.
Keywords: Brazil, Import Substitution, Inflation, Neoliberalism, Democracy
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY
Volume 39 | Number 1 | June 2010, 1-28
001AS Filho_사  2010.6.23 5:46 PM  페이지1   (주)anyprinting(pmac) 
Introduction
This paper offers a political economy analysis of the two systems of accu-
mulation in the postwar Brazilian economy: import-substituting industrialisa-
tion (ISI) and new liberalism, and the industrial policies associated with them.1
The shift across systems of accumulation has been associated with significant
changes in the role, structure, and economic policies of the Brazilian state. The
first section examines the case of ISI, departing from a review of conventional
assessments of this system of accumulation and, subsequently, offering an alter-
native interpretation of the economic and political structures underpinning this
development strategy. This section also considers the limitations of ISI and the
reasons for its terminal crisis in the eighties.
The second section focuses on the political transition to new liberalism,
that is, the shift from military rule to democracy. It is argued that this political
transition was functionally articulated with the economic transition to neoliber-
al policies as examined in the third section. This section departs from a concep-
tual review of neoliberal economic policies and reviews their implementation in
Brazil since the nineties, highlighting the significance of the real stabilisation
plan. Studied in detail are the shortcomings and limitations of new liberalism, a
system of accumulation defined through four main features: neoliberal economic
policies, microeconomic integration of domestic capital into transnational circuits, a
decisive role for finance in economic policy-making, and political democracy. This
paper concludes that both ISI and new liberalism achieved significant successes
in terms of economic development. However, both strategies were implemented
unevenly and somewhat inconsistently. These shortcomings can be analysed at
two levels: internal micro- and macro-economic limitations preventing these
development strategies from achieving their stated aims, and the external limita-
tions imposed by social conflicts during each period of time.
More generally, the paper argues that industrial policies are closely associat-
ed with specific state structures, economic constraints, and political configura-
tions which can be analysed only concretely. Consequently, there can be no gen-
eral theory of industrial policy, and there is no ‘optimum path’ of accumulation
under late development. Each system of accumulation is limited by a distinctive
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1 The system of accumulation is determined by the economic structures and institutional arrange-
ments that typify the process of capital accumulation in a specific region in a certain period of time
(Fine and Rustomjee, 1996). This is a relatively concrete concept, with no direct relationship with rela-
tively abstract concepts such as mode of regulation (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1990). 
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set of historically specific economic and political constraints, which set limits to
its potential development. These are examined in detail in the two Brazilian
cases in this paper. Finally, and for these reasons, it is concluded that industrial
policies are irreducibly political and context-specific.
ISI and Its Limitations
This section reviews the political economy of ISI in Latin America, and in
Brazil specifically, and the industrial policies associated with this development
strategy. It explains the conventional interpretations and critiques of this system
of accumulation and offers an alternative interpretation of ISI and its economic
limitations.
Conventional Interpretations of ISI
ISI is often presented as the ‘typical’ Latin American economic policy, and
Brazil was a model case of ISI between 1930 and 1980. ISI is generally viewed as
a spontaneous response to three severely adverse external shocks experienced by
most Latin American countries in succession: the two world wars and the Great
Depression. These shocks led to drastic reductions in export revenues and for-
eign financial inflows as the result of price or quantity constraints, and to large
fiscal deficits because a significant part of the state revenues relied on import tar-
iffs. 
The balance of payments and the fiscal deficit could not be financed exter-
nally under these circumstances, but sharp exchange rate devaluations and rapid
monetary expansion helped to preserve the level of domestic income despite the
falling import capacity. This ‘proto-Keynesian’ policy response helped to allevi-
ate the impact of the external crises and supported local demand for goods and
services which, in turn, fuelled the expansion of domestic manufacturing capac-
ity. The initial response to the external shocks was later supported by providing
targeted support to the manufacturing and infrastructure sectors. These poli-
cies, often called ‘populist’ by mainstream economists, or ‘developmentalist’ by
their structuralist rivals, were justified by the strategic imperative to industrialise
and modernise primary export-dependent economies and reduce their vulnera-
bility to fluctuations in international trade and in the price of their key exports. 
Rapid manufacturing growth targeting import reduction, unsupported by
significant export growth or diversification, inevitably reduced the degree of
trade openness of most Latin American economies, including Brazil. In other
Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil 
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words, abundance of natural resources, scarcity of foreign exchange, and ISI
pushed Latin American economies towards self-sufficiency which, in turn, bred
economic stagnation either because of technical inefficiencies and rent-seeking
behaviour (for the mainstream) or because the narrowness of the internal mar-
ket limited the scope of domestic production (for the structuralists). 
More specifically, ISI has been criticised from a neoclassical perspective for
five main reasons. First, this strategy is biased against primary production, and it
prevents specialisation according to comparative advantage. This leads to
resource misallocation, rent-seeking behaviour, and therefore, to low economic
growth rates in the medium term. Second, ISI creates an inefficient industrial
sector which tends to be monopolised, over-diversified, unable to achieve
economies of scale (with firms suffering from chronic excess capacity), and
internationally uncompetitive. Consequently, the domestic industry, including
local subsidiaries of transnational corporations (TNCs), needs indefinite protec-
tion. Third, ISI leads to the over-expansion of state and public sector employ-
ment, which fosters fiscal deficits and increases the vulnerability of the state to
populist pressures for greater welfare expenditures and higher civil service
wages. Fourth, ISI tends to be based on excessively capital-intensive foreign tech-
nology, given the large endowment of unskilled labour in the region. Therefore,
the manufacturing industry creates only a limited number of jobs despite its
stimulation of rural-urban migration, thus exacerbating the problem of urban
unemployment. Fifth, ISI concentrates income, because it transfers resources
from agriculture to the urban economy, although most of the population is
rural and poor. In contrast, structuralist and dependency writers have criticised
ISI primarily on two grounds. First, ISI increased rather than reduced the degree
of economic dependence of these economies because of the enhanced techno-
logical, cultural, and financial subordination through industrialisation with
imported capital and technology. Second, ISI created new patterns of inequality,
fostering the concentration of income and wealth in societies that were already
highly unequal. This was partly the natural outcome of the development of an
urban middle-class among a large, poor, and relatively unchanging countryside
and partly the outcome of deliberate policies geared toward the creation of a
stratum of urban consumers able and willing to purchase domestically pro-
duced durable consumer goods.
These insights are insufficient for a balanced assessment of the experience
of ISI in Brazil. An alternative interpretation is outlined below, which offers the
possibility of reinterpreting the key merits and shortcomings of ISI and assessing
the transition to new liberalism.
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An Alternative Interpretation of ISI
ISI is a system of accumulation based on the sequenced expansion of the
manufacturing industry, with the primary objective of replacing imports.2
Manufacturing expansion usually departs from internalisation of the produc-
tion of non-durable consumer goods (e.g., processed foods, beverages, tobacco
products, and cotton textiles). It later deepens to include the production of
durable consumer goods (especially household appliances and automobile
assembly), simple chemical and pharmaceutical products (e.g., oil refining
products and certain pharmaceutical products), and non-metallic minerals
(especially cement). In the larger countries including Brazil, ISI can reach a third
stage when the manufacturing structure becomes ‘complete’ (in the structuralist
jargon). This includes production of steel, capital goods (e.g., industrial machin-
Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil 
2 Import-substituting industrialisation is assessed by Bruton (1981, 1998) and Gereffi and Wyman
(1990). For an overview of ISI in Latin America, see Bulmer-Thomas (2003), FitzGerald (2000),
Tavares (1975), and Thorp (1992). The Brazilian case is reviewed by Baer (1995), Furtado (1972),
Hewitt (1992), and Lessa (1964).
Table 1. Brazil: Distribution of Value Added in Manufacturing Industry, 1919-59
1919 1939 1949 1959
Consumer goods 80.2 69.7 61.9 46.6
Textile 24.4 22.0 19.7 12.0
Clothing 7.3 4.8 4.3 3.6
Food 32.9 23.6 20.6 16.4
Other 15.6 19.3 17.3 14.6
Consumer durables 1.8 2.5 2.5 5.0
Intermediate goods 16.5 22.9 30.4 37.3
Metallurgy 3.8 7.6 9.4 11.8
Non-metallic minerals 2.8 4.3 6.5 6.1
Chemical 0.8 4.2 4.7 8.3
Wood 5.7 3.2 4.2 3.2
Other 3.4 3.6 5.6 7.9
Capital goods 1.5 4.9 5.2 11.1
Mechanical 0.1 1.3 2.1 3.4
Electrical 0.0 0.3 0.8 1.0
Transport equipment 1.4 3.3 2.2 6.7
Source: Abreu, Bevilacqua and Pinho (2000: 163).
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ery and electric motors), and technologically complex goods such as electronic
machines, shipbuilding, and aircraft design and assembly (see Tables 1 and 2;
Figure 1). This gradual ‘deepening’ of the manufacturing base is accompanied
by backward, forward, and horizontal linkages between established firms. As a
result of these processes, primary exports were no longer the driving force of the
Brazilian economy in the 1950s (see Bulmer-Thomas, 2003). Brazil, the world’s
largest coffee exporter in the early twentieth century, offers a particularly strik-
ing example of these processes: agriculture declined from 36% of GDP in 1910
to only 10% in 1980, while manufacturing increased from 14% to 41% of GDP
(Abreu, Bevilacqua, and Pinho, 2000: 162). 
The extent of these structural shifts varied greatly. For example, Brazil and
Mexico advanced further than Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela (not to speak of
Ecuador, Honduras, and Paraguay) for several reasons, including market size,
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Table 2. Brazil: GDP Shares (%), 1910-80
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
1910 35.8 14.0 50.2
1920 31.9 17.1 50.9
1930 30.6 16.5 52.9
1940 25.0 20.8 54.2
1950 24.3 24.1 51.6
1960 17.8 32.2 50.0
1970 11.5 35.8 52.6
1980 10.1 40.9 48.9
Source: Abreu, Bevilacqua and Pinho (2000: 162).


















001AS Filho_사  2010.6.23 5:46 PM  페이지6   (주)anyprinting(pmac) 
government policies, and the degree of social consensus around the strategy of
industrialisation.
Although ISI often starts spontaneously, experiences in Brazil and else-
where show that its continuing success requires activist industrial, financial, and
trade policies, and state provisions (or, alternatively, state incentives for private
provisions) of finance and infrastructure, especially electricity generation, water
and sanitation, transport facilities, oil extraction and refining, health, education
and training, and other requirements for manufacturing growth. The expansion
of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state is also essential, because industrial
expansion requires not only suitable policies, but also law enforcement, labour
control, regulation of social conflicts, and so on. 
Brazilian ISI was associated with a specific structure of property relations
(or a ‘macroeconomic division of labour’) and a peculiar mode of competition.
Briefly, the production of non-durable goods was predominantly undertaken by
relatively small family firms owned by domestic capitalists, which would some-
times grow but rarely change their ownership structure. In contrast, durable and
capital goods were typically produced, respectively, by foreign TNCs and
domestic oligopolistic firms. Finally, infrastructure and basic goods (steel, elec-
tricity, telecoms, oil, gas, air, road, rail and port links, and so on) were generally
supplied by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and state-owned banks played an
important role in the provision of credit, especially for industrial development
and economic diversification (Auty, 1991; Moreira, 1991; Nembhard, 1996).
The Politics of ISI
The uneasy coexistence between populism, nationalism, corporatism, and
statism under Brazilian ISI was primarily due to the intense conflicts of interest
within the elite,3 especially between agrarian and urban interests and between
manufacturing capital and finance, and between the elite and other social
groups, especially the marginalised but increasingly militant urban workers and
the emerging urban middle class (Saad-Filho, Iannini and Molinari, 2007;
Skidmore, 1973). Stripped of their rich complexity, these conflicts essentially
centred around the extent to which resources should be transferred away from
the primary export sector, and where they should be allocated—for example,
Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil 
3 The elite includes the large and medium-sized capitalists, especially financiers, industrial capitalists
(based mainly in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), large exporters and traders, the media, landowners
and local political chiefs, their intellectual and political proxies, and top civil servants. These fractions
of the elite are unrelated to the contrast between domestic and foreign capital, or the conflict between
industrial and financial interests.
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towards urban industry, infrastructure, or welfare provision (and, within these
alternatives, to which sub-sectors, regions, and social groups). 
It was widely accepted that extensive state intervention was required at sev-
eral levels in order to achieve developmental objectives (synthesised into the
goal of industrialisation). Economic interventionism was legitimised by a
nationalist ideology, according to which the ‘nation as a whole’ would progress
only through industrialisation. In this developmentalist discourse, insufficient
industrialisation was associated with backwardness and the political and eco-
nomic power of the traditional landed elites, which should be overcome
through state action that fosters economic ‘progress’. The relationship between
nationalism, statism, and developmentalism tended to become especially pro-
nounced when private capital lacked the capacity or interest to invest in strategic
areas such as oil, steel, electricity generation, or transport links. In these cases,
provision often depended on extensive state intervention, either through
nationalisation of the industry or through the provision of subsidies for private
capital. Management of ensuing conflicts of interest was never unproblematic.
Contradictory popular demands, state initiatives, and sectoral pressures were
played out in the media, in educational and research institutions, in state institu-
tions, and on the streets, sometimes violently, and the outcomes were contin-
gent on timing, circumstances, and the constellation of forces mobilised on each
side. These conflicts were displaced by the 1964 military coup.
Limitations of ISI
Despite its important achievements, ISI was severely limiting across Latin
America, and in Brazil specifically. The six most important limitations are
described below. Balance of payments constraint. This constraint captures the
relationship between state economy and the rest of the world, and it is consid-
ered by many Keynesian economists to be the most important constraint to
growth (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994). Under ISI, the balance of payments
constraint took the form of absolute scarcity of foreign exchange, largely due to
the fragility of the export base and lack of reliable access to foreign capital.
Currency shortages restricted growth and induced economic volatility because
they limited imports, investment, external market access, and the availability of
technology for manufacturing development. This constraint was addressed
through the cumulative internalisation of production of imported goods, attrac-
tion of foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign borrowing. However, this
strategy was limited on two grounds. First, although ISI reduced the demand for
imports of finished goods, it increased the demand for imported machines (to
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produce these goods), oil, and other industrial inputs (see Tavares, 1975).
Second, changes in the industrial structure increased the rigidity of the country’s
import requirements, because fluctuations in import capacity based on the
decline of the terms of trade, crop failures, insufficient foreign capital inflows,
and so on, would no longer limit the consumption of imported goods as was
the case in the past but, instead, hampered domestic production and employ-
ment. 
It follows that the conventional argument that ISI ‘closes’ the economy is
misplaced. Although Brazilian ISI contributed to a reduction in the export and
import coefficients (the former because the economy expanded faster than the
export sector, and the latter because import reduction is one of the main goals
of ISI), Brazil was always open to—and increasingly dependent upo—foreign
capital and loans for balance of payments support, provision of technology, and
supply of finance for industrial development, leading to the accumulation of
external debt, growing remittances of interests and profits, denationalisation of
industry, and increasing dependence on foreign technology.
Fragility and inefficiency of the domestic financial system. The Brazilian
financial sector was structurally unsuited for the provision of long-term finance
for industrial development (Studart, 1995). This sector developed in order to
finance production of export crops, and trading and speculation with primary
products, especially coffee, which normally required short loan terms and
offered relatively liquid and readily-available collateral. Brazil’s banks were gen-
erally short-termist and speculative, its financial system was shallow, and its
financial institutions were generally unwilling or unable to provide long-term
finance to a rapidly expanding manufacturing sector. Consequently, manufac-
turing investment was funded primarily by FDI, foreign loans, state-owned
banks, directed credit, state subsidies, and private firms’ own resources.
However, this combination of sources of finance is fragile, and it eventually
proved to be unsustainable (see below).
Fiscal fragility. The state played a key role in the vertical deepening and hor-
izontal integration of the manufacturing sector. The state influenced production
and investment decisions through specialist agencies and institutions, mediated
the relationship between domestic and foreign interests, played a key role in
strategic technological development, and subsidised capital accumulation
through the provision of cheap credit, infrastructure, and inputs. Although
activist industrial policies were essential, they were not adequately financed by
the tax system. Brazilian ISI was accompanied by fiscal deficits, inflation, and the
accumulation of substantial foreign and domestic liabilities of central and local
governments.
Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil 
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High inflation. This was typical of ISI for two main reasons (Saad-Filho and
Mollo, 2002). On the one hand, social divisions fostered distributive conflicts,
with social groups fighting for shares of the national income through higher
prices, taxes, and wage demands. On the other hand, inflation was the outcome
of the limitations of the financial structures underpinning the process of accu-
mulation, especially fiscal deficits, lack of bank finance, and shallow and specu-
lative stock markets, which compelled firms to rely on price increases to fund
investment. This institutional structure facilitated the adoption of rigid mark-up
pricing rules by leading firms, which protected their revenue against demand
shifts or adverse fluctuations in the level of activity. This may have protected
investment in key industries, but it also increased vulnerability of the economy
to inflation through distributive conflicts or adverse supply shocks.
High inequality and social tensions. Brazil is one of the most unequal soci-
eties in the world in terms of access to income, wealth, and privilege. ISI rein-
forced these inequalities because it did not create sufficient jobs, wages were per-
manently compressed by labour abundance and outright repression, and land
reform was lacking. Moreover, manufacturing development responded to the
existing pattern of demand which was systematically biased towards relatively
expensive durable consumer goods produced by transnational corporations
employing capital-intensive imported technologies (Furtado, 1972). These
social and distributional features limited the domestic market, skewed the struc-
ture of demand away from mass-consumed non-durable goods, and frequently
blocked an industry from expanding unless income was further concentrated or
consumer credit was made available, which often required access to foreign
finance. These inequalities have fostered severe social conflicts in Brazil, which
reduced the ability of the state to impose co-ordinated industrial policies. 
Lack of policy co-ordination. The Brazilian state could rarely exercise the
degree of economic co-ordination essential for the long-term success of ISI.
Consequently, ISI was often guided by short-term profitability considerations
rather than a long-term vision of the needs of accumulation. New economic
sectors would arise, which brought about demographic, sociological, cultural,
and political changes, created new interest groups that competed for income,
status, and state incentives, and increased the complexity of policy formulation
and implementation. State agencies frequently clashed against other agencies
with different priorities, and these co-ordination problems were worsened by
the extent of TNC penetration and the foreign dependence of the manufactur-
ing sector, especially in finance and technology. These weaknesses help to
explain the excessive fragmentation of industry, the fragility of the national sys-
tem of innovation, and the failure of most firms to compete successfully in
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international markets, thus perpetuating the balance of payments constraint.
The remarkable success stories in the steel, auto, aircraft, and, temporarily, in the
defence and telecommunications industries, show what the textile, plastics, toy,
wood, beverages, processed food, and other sectors were missing. These limita-
tions help to explain the ‘stumbling’ character of ISI, the volatility of the eco-
nomic growth rates, and the reproduction of severe social and economic prob-
lems including mass poverty, concentration of income, and insufficient infra-
structure provision.
The Crisis of ISI
The limitations outlined in the previous section were due primarily to the
weakness rather than the ‘excessive’ strength or size of the state. In brief, the
Brazilian state was interventionist, but it was institutionally disarticulated and
unable to impose consistent priorities over conflicting interests, especially in the
dominant power bloc. This social group generally found detailed planning and
large-scale state intervention unacceptable, because they upset the political bal-
ance within the elite and sometimes promoted the interests of the poor majori-
ty. 
The structural constraints and fragilities of ISI and the strongly negative
impact of the external shocks of the seventies and early eighties made macroeco-
nomic management extremely difficult in Brazil. These shocks showed that the
monetary, financial, fiscal, tax, and exchange rate policies associated with ISI
had become incompatible with internal and external balance. The oil shocks
and the international debt crisis worsened the balance of payments constraint,

























Table 3. Brazil: Annual Inflation Rate (CPI, %)
Source: FIPE, www.ipeadata.gov.br
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and contributed to the development of an acute fiscal crisis, culminating with a
slide towards hyperinflation (see Table 3). Social conflicts intensified, political
instability became endemic, and policy shifts were limited by cumulative institu-
tional weaknesses and growing political paralysis. The military government lost
its capacity to manage the economy. In the early eighties, it had become widely
agreed that political changes were imperative.
The Political Transition to New Liberalism
Between the early seventies and the early nineties, the Brazilian elite gradu-
ally convinced themselves that the restoration of economic dynamism would be
compatible with the preservation of the existing patterns of exclusion only
through the introduction of a new system of accumulation. This system, which
can be defined as ‘new liberalism’, includes four main features: neoliberal eco-
nomic policies, the microeconomic integration of domestic capital into transnation-
al circuits (i.e., denationalisation of firms and their integration into global value
chains), a decisive role for finance in economic policy-making, and political democ-
racy. This section reviews the political aspect of Brazil’s transition to new liberal-
ism. 
The defining feature of the Brazilian military regime, in power between
1964 and 1985, was its attempt to preserve social exclusion through the combi-
nation of economic growth with varying levels of repression. The power of the
regime declined gradually after 1974 due to the political exhaustion of the gov-
ernment’s heavy-handed approach towards dissent and the economic exhaus-
tion of the regime’s growth strategy. The country’s foreign debt escalated after
the first oil shock, and inflation rose from 20% to 100% in the early eighties.
The second oil shock, in 1979-80, triggered a deep economic crisis and the first
GDP contraction since 1929. The economy stopped responding to government
policies, and the military regime ran out of options.
Military rule finally collapsed due to the emergence of a growing democrat-
ic mass movement in 1977-85. Political contestation encompassed a wide range
of modalities of struggle, including criticisms of corruption, economic misman-
agement, and lack of democracy and political accountability, renewed trade
union activities, and mass mobilisation for economic democracy and political
freedom. At this stage, a significant change took place within the elite; for the
first time since 1930, a consensus emerged around political democracy.4 This
	 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 39 No. 1, June 2010
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consensus was due to external pressures as well as domestic developments, and
it facilitated the democratic transition because it defused the conflicts that might
have arisen with the change in political regime (Markoff and Baretta, 1990;
Weffort, 1989). For this reason, Brazilian democracy did not emerge on the
ruins of the institutions left behind by the dictatorship as was the case in
Argentina. Instead, the military commanders of the regime and the country’s
traditional elites managed to control the democratic transition. 
The substance of the elite pact that hijacked the democratic movement was
straightforward. In exchange for political freedom, redistribution of economic
power was ruled out. Under these limited conditions, the democratic transition
established the most open and stable regime in the history of the Republic. For
more than 25 years there has been no press censorship, no parties or movements
of any significance have been banned, and civil rights are formally guaranteed to
a greater extent than in many ‘old’ democracies. For the first time since the late
nineteenth century, the military no longer openly interfere in the political
sphere, and the political influence of religious leaders has been curtailed. Finally,
right-wing ideology has been demoralised, and no influential organisation
claims to be either ‘conservative’ or on the ‘right’ (however right-wing their
policies and practices may be).
The Economic Transition
Neoliberal economic policies are hegemonic in Brazil as well as the world
today (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005; Saad-Filho and Morais, 2004). This sec-
tion reviews the theoretical foundations of these policies, and the transition
from economic policies geared toward the promotion of ISI to neoliberal poli-
cies in Brazil. 
The Foundations of Neoliberalism
Like all mainstream approaches, neoliberalism at the microeconomic level
presumes that, in a decentralised and deregulated economy, free competition
leads to full employment equilibrium. Consequently, the market rather than the
state should address such economic problems as industrial development, inter-
Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil 	
social groups which, by virtue of their institutional power and political influence, can implement these
projects through state institutions. This concept is related to the Gramscian notion of hegemony.
Neither of them presumes unanimity.
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national competitivity, and employment creation. By the same token, policy-
oriented shifts in relative prices and in allocation of resources should be avoided.
At the macroeconomic level, neoliberalism argues that the world economy is
characterised by the relentless advance of ‘globalisation’ (usually defined superfi-
cially and imprecisely) and international capital mobility. They offer the possi-
bility of rapid growth through the attraction of foreign capital. However, this
strategy can be successful only if domestic policies conform to the short-term
interests of the financial markets, which implies that interventionist policies are
unfeasible because any policy deemed undesirable or unsustainable by the
financial markets would lead to capital flight, balance of payments crisis, and
economic collapse. ‘Policy credibility’ is essential and, in practice, it derives from
the preferences of the international financial conglomerates, the US govern-
ment, and the IMF. In sum, neoliberalism is optimal because it offers the best
and the only viable set of economic policies and these policies are viable and
optimal because they are in the interests of international capital. 
The most important tool of neoliberal policy is the interest rate. Presumably,
the ‘correct’ interest rate can deliver balance of payments equilibrium, low infla-
tion, sustainable levels of investment and consumption and, therefore, high
growth rates in the long term (Arestis and Sawyer, 1998). The implementation
of neoliberal policies can be analysed from two angles. On the one hand, it gen-
erally raises interest rates above their level in an alternative regime where similar
objectives would be pursued using a wider set of tools. However, higher interest
rates tend to reduce the levels of employment, investment, output, and income
relative to what they could be in an alternative scenario, both in the short and in
the long run. In this case, long-term unemployment tends to rise because capac-
ity becomes fully utilised, and the balance of payments constraint becomes
binding before unemployment declines sufficiently. On the other hand, the
neoliberal policies implemented in Brazil and other newly industrialised coun-
tries during the 1990s included trade, financial, and capital account liberalisa-
tion (see below). They were justified by the need to increase economic efficiency
and to eliminate high inflation. However, they require not only that domestic
interest rates should rise, but also that they should exceed international rates by
a large margin because of the political, currency, and other risks in these coun-
tries. 
It is impossible to determine the size of the interest rate differential required
to attract a given volume of foreign resources due to continuous changes in
domestic circumstances and international liquidity. Excessively low margins and
low liquidity tend to be associated with insufficient inflows and, potentially, with
capital flight and currency devaluation. In contrast, high margins and abundant
	 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 39 No. 1, June 2010
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liquidity are associated with large capital inflows, accumulation of foreign
reserves, deflationary pressures, and currency overvaluation. The impact of the
interest rate margins on aggregate demand is ambiguous with a potential to
shift, because low (high) domestic interest rates can increase (reduce) consump-
tion and investment through the usual Keynesian mechanisms; or they can
reduce (increase) because of the combined impact of the international capital
movements and the ensuing changes in the exchange rate. Only excessively high
interest rate differentials can persist over long periods, but the consequences of
chronic conditions may often be even more serious than those of the acute vari-
ety. They may include deindustrialisation (because of high financial costs and
foreign competition), rapid growth of the domestic public debt (DPD) (if the
capital inflows are sterilised), and the creation of a ‘casino’ atmosphere in which
financial strategies steadily shift from hedge towards speculative and, finally,
Ponzi finance (Arestis and Glickman, 2002).
Inflation and Stabilisation
It was suggested in the second section that the Brazilian elite converged
around the view of ISI having faced three insurmountable problems in the
eighties: inefficiency of the financial sector, continuing industrial backwardness,
and difficulty to create a dynamic national system of innovation (Laplane and
Sarti, 1999: 198). It gradually became accepted that these obstacles could be
overcome only if the size of the state was reduced through expenditure cuts, the
reform of the fiscal, tax, and social security systems, and privatisation of state
enterprises. It was expected that fiscal reforms would reduce inflation, while
financial liberalisation would increase domestic savings and investment. Finally,
liberalisation of foreign trade and capital inflows, and the resolution of the
remaining conflicts with the international financial system, would facilitate the
attraction of direct and portfolio investment flows as well as industrial restruc-
turing in those sectors compatible with the country’s comparative advantages.
Productivity would rise, followed by a structural improvement in the balance of
payments (Auty, 1991; Moreira, 1991). In sum, the integration of Brazilian pro-
ductive and financial capital into transnational conglomerates would drive a vir-
tuous circle of growth that would turn Brazil into a developed economy.
These policy prescriptions were implemented gradually, and increasingly
consistently, by successive governments. In 1988, during the Sarney administra-
tion, the domestic financial system was reformed and, starting in 1989, interna-
tional capital flows were liberalised (Studart, 1999). The exchange rate regime
was made increasingly flexible in the following years (Banco Central do Brasil,
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1993). From 1990, during the Collor administration, Brazil reduced import
restrictions incrementally and implemented the resolutions of the Uruguay
Round of GATT. The Collor and Franco administrations adopted strongly con-
tractionary monetary policies in order to control inflation, attract foreign capi-
tal, and generate exportable surpluses. The Cardoso government fully imple-
mented a neoliberal economic strategy, especially through the Real Plan, and the
Lula administration has pursued essentially the same policies introduced by his
predecessor. 
Between early 1992 and mid-1994, Brazilian inflation increased slowly but
relentlessly from under 20% per month to over 40% per month. Inflation con-
trol was essential for the political legitimacy and economic viability of the new
elite consensus. High inflation was eliminated through the Real Plan (Governo
do Brasil, 1993).5 This stabilisation plan was also used to legitimise the econom-
ic transition to neoliberalism.
Five policies underpinned the Real Plan. First, import liberalisation: Foreign
competition limits the prices domestic firms can charge (otherwise, their mar-
kets will be lost to imports). It also limits the workers’ wage demands, since pay
increases could make local firms uncompetitive. Neoliberals also claim that
trade liberalisation forces local firms to compete against ‘best practice’ foreign
producers, which should help to raise productivity across the economy.
Unsuccessful producers will close down, and their capital and labour should be
deployed more productively elsewhere.
Second, exchange rate overvaluation: It enhances the impact of trade liberal-
isation on inflation and competitivity. These policies are highly effective against
inflation, and they can be very popular with consumers. However, their impact
on the balance of payments and on local industry and employment can be dev-
astating. Brazilian goods imports increased from US$20.6 billion to US$50.0 bil-
lion between 1992 and 1995. This structural shift was pursued deliberately: 
[T]he logic of the exchange rate policy is to reduce exports, raise imports and
the current account deficit and, therefore, make the country import capital
again. These [capital] imports and the domestic savings accumulated by the
private sector will finance economic growth. (Pedro Malan, Minister of
Finance, Gazeta Mercantil, 24 October, 1994)
Cheap imports badly harmed the manufacturing industry. In Brazil, the
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proportion of manufacturing value added in GDP reached 41% in 1980. By
2001, this ratio had declined to 27%. Manufacturing sector employment fell,
with the loss of more than one million jobs between 1989 and 1997, and average
real wages declined by 8% between 1994 and 2001 (Bonelli, 1999: 89; Saad-Filho
and Mollo, 2006). Third, domestic financial liberalisation: It was expected that
the deregulation of the financial sector would help to increase savings and the
availability of funds for investment. In fact, the opposite happened, and both
savings and investment rates declined. The savings rate fell from 28% of GDP in
the mid-’80s, to around 20% in the mid-nineties and below 15% in 2001, while
investment rates fell from an average of 22.2% of GDP in the eighties, to 18.2%
in the nineties, and 16.1% in 2001-06. The inflow of foreign capital may have
replaced rather than supplemented domestic savings, financing consumption
rather than investment (Bresser-Pereira, 2003). The decline of the investment
rate helps to explain the dismal growth rates in Brazil: between 1994 and 1999,
Brazil’s average annual real GDP growth rate was only 2.6% (3.2% between
1994 and 2008). The economy, on the other hand, expanded on average by
6.4% per annum between 1933 and 1980. 
Fourth, fiscal reforms: The public sector deficits that, presumably, induced
high inflation were addressed. These reforms were largely successful through
privatisations, expenditure cuts, and tax increases (Giambiagi, 2007).
Finally, liberalisation of the capital account of the balance of payments: This
was supposedly essential to attract foreign savings and modern technology. 
This policy combination offered a fail-safe strategy to reduce inflation and,
simultaneously, lock in the neoliberal reforms. Cheap imports were allowed in,
while high interest rates, foreign loans, mass privatisations and TNC takeovers
of domestic firms brought the foreign capital that paid for them. Inflation tum-
bled while consumers gorged in new automobiles, computers, and DVD play-
ers, and splashed out in artificially cheap foreign holidays. Consumer goods
imports increased from US$606 million to US$8.2 billion between 1985 and
1998. In the same period, foreign travel spending increased from US$441 mil-
lion to US$5.7 billion. Euphoria reigned supreme; neoliberalism bribed those it
had not yet convinced, and it seemed that it could do no wrong.
However, the neoliberal reforms did not resolve the shortcomings of ISI
(explained in the section on alternative interpretation of ISI), and they desta-
bilised the balance of payments and the country’s productive system. The
reforms hollowed out the industrial chains built during ISI and reduced the
local content of manufacturing production. Wages and profits declined because
of competing imports, the rising share of interest in the national income (due to
the financial reforms and the permanently high real interest rates), and the diffi-
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culty in developing new competitive industries. Structural unemployment
mounted. Neoliberalism discarded import substitution and promoted ‘produc-
tion substitution’ financed by foreign capital instead.
Industrial Policy and the Restructuring of the Manufacturing Sector
The neoliberal transition introduced into Brazil a new industrial structure
based on the microeconomic integration of production and finance into
transnational value chains. It was expected that intensified competition would
lead to partnerships, mergers, and acquisitions or to the collapse of the ineffi-
cient firms, raising average productivity. First, the share of imported manufac-
tured goods increased sharply (see Table 4).
Second, participation of foreign firms in mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
and foreign purchases of minority stakes in domestic companies increased sig-
nificantly. Foreign firms participated in 49.1% of the 3,276 M&As between 1990
and 1999. Both the number of M&As and the degree of foreign involvement
increased during this period.6 The most affected sectors were electric and elec-
tronic goods, telecommunications equipment, car parts, and processed foods. 
Growing foreign participation contributed to the search for efficiency
gains. The new mode of competition was influential at several levels. First, it led
to a shift in management techniques towards ‘modern’ methods and the down-
sizing of the workforce. Second, rising manufacturing unemployment was rein-
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Table 4. Brazil: Import Coefficients, 1993 and 1996 (%)
SECTOR 1993 1996
1. Standardised capital goods and electronic goods 29 65-75
2. Chemical inputs, fertilisers, resins 20-26 33-42
3. Auto parts, natural textiles, capital goods made to order, rubber 8-15 20-25
4. Pharmaceuticals, tractors, electric and electronic consumer 7-11 13-16
goods, glass, chemical goods
5. Synthetic textiles, petrochemical inputs, cars, food, paper 3-6 9-12
and cardboard
6. Beverages, shoes, plastics, dairy products, semi-processed foods 0.7-3 4-8
7. Non-tradable goods (cement, inputs, and others) 0.5-2.5 1-4
Source: Coutinho, Baltar and Camargo (1999: 70).
6 PriceWaterhouse Coopers (Folha de S. Paulo, 21 January, 2000, p. 2-1). For similar estimates, see
Gonçalves (1999: 138-42).
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forced by the introduction of new labour-saving technologies. Third, firms
tended to shift their output mix towards simpler products with less value added
in order to reap efficiency gains. As a result, manufacturing productivity
increased, on average, by 7.6% annually between 1990 and 1997 (Feijó and
Carvalho, 1998). Coutinho, Baltar, and Camargo (1999: 66, 73) rightly conclude
that:
[The] avoidance of industrial development policies by the State…strongly con-
tributed to the increasing exposure of domestic industry to imports, especially
in high value added sectors and those with high technological content… [T]he
explosion of imports rapidly ‘hollowed out’ the productive chains, and led to a
large reduction in intra-industry demand…which sharply reduced the econo-
my’s capacity to create jobs… [T]he frantic attempts to cut costs have led to
successive rounds of innovation and rationalisation in the productive process
that generated strong tensions in the labour market… [This is partly due to
the] entry of new competitors and the redefinition of strategic alliances [that]
have destabilized the oligopolistic structures inherited from previous
decades… The ‘modernisation’ of [these] oligopolistic structures has ruptured
the existing supply chains, led to the entry of new [foreign] suppliers, reduced
the degree of verticalisation and increased the import coefficients… [The]
higher coefficient of imported inputs and components (and, therefore, the
substantially lower value creation in the country) means that the success of
efforts to stimulate domestic demand for intermediate goods and employment
will tend…to be very modest.
These heavy blows were softened by the expansion of trade within
Mercosur and by the transfer of some SOEs to Brazilian capital.7
The New Policy Regime
The Brazilian experience shows that the new liberal reforms can secure
short-term macroeconomic stability and growth. This is due to two main rea-
sons. First, they are part of the conventional wisdom of the age and embedded
in the belief systems of most domestic and international institutions. Therefore,
Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil 	
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Argentine market are concentrated on medium-high and medium-low technological intensity prod-
ucts, which include 70-75% of the sales of Brazilian industrial goods. The participation of these prod-
ucts in Brazilian exports to the rest of the world is less than 40%’ (Machado and Markwald, 1997:
197). See also Leal and Silva (2009).
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they are ‘credible’ by definition. Second, if international liquidity is high and
interest rates are low, as was the case in the mid-seventies, again in the early
nineties, and after the recovery from the 2000-2001 slump, trade and capital
account liberalisation seem to abolish the balance of payments constraint. They
can attract capital inflows to finance a large trade deficit, allowing consumption,
investment, and growth rates to increase rapidly, in a virtuous circle that may
last several years. However, if these foreign capital flows decline, as they did in
the early eighties, the mid-nineties, 2000-2001, and since mid-2007, countries
following neoliberal policies can find themselves in a vulnerable position. The
balance of payments constraint can reappear suddenly, either because of the
scarcity of foreign exchange or because higher international interest rates push
up domestic interest rates, squeezing the economy both internally and externally
at the same time.
In Brazil, the crisis of the Real Plan in 1998-99 (Morais, Saad-Filho and
Coelho, 1999) led to the introduction of a new macroeconomic policy regime
that includes inflation targeting, large fiscal surpluses, and the managed fluctua-
tion of the real. The aim of these policies was to preserve low inflation, stabilise
the DPD and the exchange rate, and eliminate current account deficit. These
policies and goals have also been pursued by the Lula administration.
This policy regime has been partially successful. Devaluations of the real in
1999 and in 2002 triggered a temporary inflation bubble, while revaluations of
the currency have been associated with declining rate of inflation (see Figure 2;
Araujo and Leite, 2009). Although the government’s inflation targets have nor-
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Figure 2. Brazil: Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) (average 2000 = 100) and Infla-
tion Rate (CPI) (% per month)
Source: Ipeadata.
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mally not been achieved, inflation rate is relatively low and stable (Bresser-
Pereira, 2003; Lima, Maka, and Mendonça, 2007). 
Permanently high real interest rates during the period of the real (see
Figure 3) are due to the high costs and continuing inefficiencies of the Brazilian
financial system as well as the latent conflicts between monetary and fiscal poli-
cies under new liberalism. In summary, contractionary monetary policy auto-
matically relaxes the fiscal policy stance because of the growth and high liquidity
of the DPD. This leads the government to contract monetary and fiscal policies
again in a vicious circle that can gradually increase the financial fragility of the
state. This conflict requires permanently high fiscal surpluses (which is political-
ly costly and economically damaging), privatisations (which are largely exhaust-
ed) or, more realistically, the reduction of domestic interest rates. However,
lower rates can conflict with the balance of payments constraint because they
may trigger capital outflows, or they could reduce the demand for public securi-
ties, making it harder to finance the public deficit and potentially lead to the
monetisation of the DPD. This would trigger a currency collapse, an inflation
bubble, or both. However, since the new policy regime automatically blames
excess demand for any increase in the rate of inflation (regardless of the level of
capacity utilisation or the unemployment rate), inflation stabilisation will
always require high interest rates and a high fiscal surplus, perpetuating the lim-
itations of the current policy regime. 
The economic limitations outlined above help to explain why the Brazilian
trade balance reacted slowly after the currency crisis. The trade balance shifted
to a surplus only in 2001 and the current account two years later. Trade surplus-















































































































































Figure 3. Brazil: Real Overnight Interest Rates (annualised monthly rate, %)
Source: Calculated from Ipeadata.
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es have proven to be sustained (see Table 5). In particular, expansion of Brazilian
exports has brought much-needed relief to the balance of payments. However,
this has been due largely to favourable market conditions for some of the coun-
try’s main commodity exports and the excellent performance of the agribusi-
ness sector. This, and the slower growth of manufacturing output and processed
exports, has led to the re-primarisation of the Brazilian economy, which is not
easily compatible with the creation of quality employment and the improve-
ment of social welfare in a Latin American economy. 
Conclusion: The Limitations of New Liberalism
New liberalism includes a hegemonic political settlement (procedural
democracy) and a hegemonic set of economic policies and relations (neoliberal-
ism). New liberalism has become the mode of existence of capitalism in Brazil—
a system of accumulation—with a specific material basis corresponding to a
particular social structure and relationships among domestic capital, foreign
capital, and the state. 
New liberalism has transferred state capacity to allocate resources intertem-
porally (the balance between investment and consumption), intersectorally (dis-
tribution of investment, employment, and output), and internationally to an
increasingly integrated and US-led financial sector. The policy reforms have dis-
mantled the production systems established during ISI and the social structures
and patterns of employment that corresponded to them. They have led to the
privatisation of the most productive and financial SOEs, and promoted the
alliance between foreign and domestic capital at the firm level and the denation-
alisation of industry and infrastructure. The transnationalisation of production
and finance (‘globalisation’) was, to a large extent, a process of international
integration at the firm level that restructured the ‘national’ system of production
at a higher level of productivity and integrated the local elite internationally. The
economy has become structurally more dependent on foreign trade, invest-
ment, and technology. Brazil’s productive base has shifted away from the long-
term requirements of national accumulation and towards the short-term imper-
atives of global accumulation instead. 
The Brazilian state has become profoundly depleted in the areas of eco-
nomic planning, control, and policy implementation. In contrast, state capacity
in monetary policy implementation, financial sector regulation, and security has
been extended significantly. The financial reforms have embedded private sector
interests into the policy-making process through the decisive role of finance in
Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Development Policy in Brazil 
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the pricing of government securities, determination of interest rates, and financ-
ing of the public sector. The reforms also increased the role of the private finan-
cial institutions in the foreign exchange market and, therefore, in the country’s
relations with the rest of the world. 
The neoliberal transition has contributed to the disorganisation of the
workforce and to a significant shift in power away from the majority regard-
less—and, to some extent, because—of the stabilisation of political democracy.
Rather than relying on military force, the new liberal consensus has disciplined
the working class through contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, higher
unemployment and labour turnover, personal debt, and the continuing threat
of inflationary or balance of payments crises should the distributive conflicts get
out of hand.
At the political level, democracy has become established as the political
form of neoliberalism in Brazil. In that country, the neoliberal transition and the
democratic transition were mutually reinforcing and, eventually, mutually con-
stituting. They were associated with a shift in the mechanisms of social domina-
tion towards a combination of democracy and neoliberalism, which contributed
to social fragmentation and the dismantling of the resistance movements which
had emerged during the dictatorship. The symbiosis between neoliberalism and
procedural democracy operates at three levels. First, the neoliberal economic
transition was achieved through, and validated by, democratic means. Second,
neoliberal policies support the democratic regime because they fragment the
workers through higher unemployment, faster labour turnover, the repression
of trade union activities, and the rise of economic insecurity. Under neoliberal-
ism, the repression of working class activities becomes primarily ‘economic’
rather than ‘political’, as was the case under the dictatorship. Third, democracy
is the best political regime for neoliberalism because it guarantees the stability
and predictability of the ‘rules of the game’, making it more easily managed by
the moneyed interests.
In spite of these successes, the new liberal system of accumulation is limit-
ed, and the state is less capable of addressing the problems of industrial co-ordi-
nation and growth than at any time since 1929. The combination between the
unresolved weaknesses of ISI and the flaws of neoliberalism has entrenched eco-
nomic stagnation and reduced the scope for the implementation of distributive
economic and social policies in the country beyond the limited achievements of
the social programmes of the Cardoso and Lula administrations (Marques et al.,
2009; Paes de Barros et al., 2007). 
From the point of view of the majority, the challenge is not simply to elect
governments that are programmematically committed to searching for an alter-
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native economic model. After several victories which eventually proved to be
largely hollow, it must be admitted that attempts to ‘vote away’ the neoliberal
reforms are bound to fail, for these reforms are not limited to ideology or policy
choice. They have acquired a material basis in the transformations that they
have wrought onto the economic fabric of Brazil. Transcending neoliberalism
will require economic and political changes that can be carried out only through
the construction of an alternative system of accumulation. This project will
require a systematic dismantling of the material basis of neoliberalism initially
through a set of pro-poor and democratic economic policy initiatives, which
will support a shift to a model of development that can generate more equal dis-
tributions of income, wealth, and power, and higher levels of material welfare
(Saad-Filho, 2007). This is the fundamental condition for democracy. 
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